Policy Distortions, Size of Government, and Growth by William Easterly
NEER WORKING PAPER SERIES
POLICY DISTORTIONS,SIZE OF GOVERNMENT, AND GROWTH
William Easterly
Working Paper No. 3214




An earlier version of this paper was written as background to the Report on
Adjustment Lending II.I am grateful for comments by Ricardo Martin and other
participants in the RALII workshop, by Stanley Fischer and other participants
in the DECVP workshop, by Deborah Wetzel, Michael Gavin, Bela Balassa, and
members of CECMG. This paper is part of NBER's research program in Growth.
Any opinions expressed are those of the author not those of the National Bureau
of Economic Research.NBER Working Paper #3214
December 1989
POLICY DISTORTIONS, SIZE OF GOVERNMENT, AND GROWTH
ABSTRACT
This paper analyzes the structural relationship between policies that
distort resource allocation and long-ten growth. It first reviews briefly the
Solow model in which steady-state growth depends only on exogenous
technological change. Policy distortions do affect the rate of growth in the
transition to the steady state in the Solow model. However, growth falls off
so rapidly in the Solow transition as to make it unsatisfactory as a model of
long-ten growth, even over periods as short as a decade.
The paper proposes an increasing returns model in the spirit of the new
literature on economic growth. With increasing returns, endogenous economic
variables -- andthus policy -- willaffect the steady-state rate of growth.
The model gives output as a linear function of total capital, but a decreasing
function of each of two types of capital. The distortion is defined as a
policy intervention that increases the cost of using one of the types of
capital. The relationship between this distortion and steady-stste growth is
negative but highly nonlinear. At very low levels and very high levels of
distortion, the effect on growth of changing the distortion is close to zero.
Changes in structural parameters of the economy -- theelasticity of
substitution between the two types of capital and the share of nondistorted
capital in production -- willaffect significantly the impact of the policy
distortion on growth.
The model is extended to an analysis of the relationship between the size
of government and growth by treating the distortion strictly as a tax on one
form of capital. The tax revenue is used to finance the acquisition of
productive government capital. There is then a tradeoff between two forms of
distortion- -one resulting from distortionary taxation and the other from
insufficient public capital. Increasing the tax from zero has a positive
effect on growth, but with further tax increases the relationship will
eventually turn negative. Tax revenue ("size of government") as a function of
the tax rate will be given by a Laffer curve. Growth still remains above a
certain minimum as the tax rate gets arbitrarily large, but the range between
relationship maximum and minimum growth will be larger than in the original
model. The relationship between tax revenue and growth for alternative tax
rates can be positive, negative, or zero. The same is true of the relationship
between public and private investment. Changes in the share of tax revenue
devoted to capital accumulation ("government saving") will affect the results.
The results suggest that simple linear relationships between distortions
and growth or between size of government and growth are untenable. The
dialogue between advocates of liberalization and policymakers could be enriched
by a recognition of the structural factors that influence the effect of
lowering distortions on growth.
William Easterly
World Bank
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Recent experience in developing countries has generated new interest
in the theory of long-run economic growth. The decade of the 1980's has been a
"lost decade' for many developing countries as a combination of policy
mistakes and external shocks have led to a slowdown of economic growth. As
Table 1 shows, this slowdown has been widespread across regions and income
levels, with the sole exception of Asian countries. It has been particularly
pronounced in the highly indebted countries and in sub-Saharan Africa. In
view of the critical need to restart growth in those countries, the theory of
the determinants of economic growth has recently attracted considerable
attention.
1. The Solow model and long-run growth
This renewed attention comes after a long hiatus. The theory of
economic growth has been guided for many years by the seminal model of Solow
(1956). Solow's work was done partially in response to the Harrod-Domar model
of the 1930's, which exhibited unstable dynamics because of a linear capital-
output ratio and the response of investment to output changes. Solow pointed
out that output growth could be a stable process when the production function
allows the smooth substitution of labor for capital. He also pointed Out
something that was a nagging embarrassment to the field. If we assume
constant returns to scale and exogenous labor (population) growth, then
capital accumulation cannot be a source of long-run growth. If capital grows
faster than labor, then diminishing returns will set in and growth will not be
sustainable. Since capital accumulation is the variable in the Solow model
that reflects all changes in the economic environment, this suggests that
nothing endogenous can determine long-run growth. For example, both the levelwe7/ll—Ol—89 2
Table 1: Average annual growth rate of GD? in developing countries (percent)
Country Group 1965-80 1980.87
Low income economies 5.4 6.1
China and India 5.3 8.5
Other 5.5 1.7
Middle-income economies 6.2 2.8
Lower middle-income 5.7 2.1
Upper middle-income 6.7 3.4
High-income economies 3.7 2.6
OECD countries 3.6 2.7
Others 1/ 8.1 -2.6
Regional Aggregates (low and middle income)
East Asia 7.2 8.0
Europe, H. East & N. Africa 6.2 NA
Latin America & Caribbean 6.0 1.4
South Asia 3.8 4.8
Sub.Saharan Africa 5.1 0.4
Memorandum items:
Seventeen highly indebted 6.1 1.1
Highest growth rate 2/ 15.2 13.0
Lowest growth rate 2/ 0.1 -6.1
Source: World Bank (1989).
Note: Averages are weighted.
1/ Countries classified by UN or otherwise regarded by their authorities as
developing.
2/ For an individual country.we7/ll-Ol—89 3
of saving and distortions of resource allocation will affect only the level of
output, not the long-run rate of growth. Thus, Solow identified exogenous
technological change as the engine of per capita income growth.
The Solow model had clear implications for growth of developing
countries. It predicted that productivity of capital would be higher and per
capita income would grow faster in capital-poor countries in the transition to
the long run (assuming labor quality is the same in rich and poor countries).
Lending to developing countries would thus have a high rate of return, and
income levels of all countries would tend to converge over time. While
empirical results on convergence are mixed, it is clear that at best it has
been disappointingly slow in coming.1Table 2 shows per capita income growth
by region and income level for the past two decades. The countries growing
the slowest are low-income countries (excluding China and India), which is due
in part to the abysmal growth performance of sub-Saharan Africa. The fastest
growth is in middle income East Asia, and in high-income developing countries
(largely oil exporters). OECD countries grew at roughly the same rate as
lower middle-income developing countries, while upper middle-income countries
grew slightly faster.
These differences no doubt partly reflect different levels of
investment, saving, and policy distortions across countries, since these do
have an effect in the transition to the steady state in the Solow model.
Table 2 shows, for example, the low level of investment and saving in sub-
Saharan Africa as compared to the high levels in East Asia. Corden (1971)
shoved howtradepolicy can affect growth in the transition to the steady
state in the Solow model. Much empirical work has indeed shown growth to be
negatively affected by trade policy distortions, financial sector distortions,
1.5cc Romer (1986), Baumol (1986), Barro (1989b) and Barro and Sala-j-Martin
(1989)we7/11-01-89 4







I Gross Domestic Gross Domestic
1965-87 Investment Saving
Low income 3.1 28 26
China and India 3.9 31 31
Other 1.5 19 15
Middle income 2.5 23 25
Lower 2.2 21 21
Upper 2.9 25 27
High income 2.3 21 21.
OECD 2.3 21 21
Other 1/ 3.5 25 24
Low and middle income by region
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.6 16 13
East Asia 5.1 30 35
South Asia 1.8 22 19
Europe, Middle East,
North Africa 2.5 n.a. n.a.
Latin America & Caribbean 2.1 18 20
Low and middle income
Maximum 8.9
Minimum -2.7
Source: World Bank (1989)
1/ Countries classified by UN or otherwise regarded by their authorities as
developing.we7/ll-O1-$9 5
macroeconomic instability, and current government spending, among other policy
variables 2
However, much of the empirical work on growth and endogenous economic
variables does not directly use the Solow model or any other theoretical
framework. Much of it is open to question as to direction of causality --
perhapsgrowth leads to good policies rather than the other way around. In
the absence of good measures of many policy distortions and without knowledge
of the underlying functional relationship between these distortions and
growth, the impact of any particular policy change on growth is still in
doubt.
2. From the Solow transition to the new growth literature
While the Solow model can provide a framework to relate policy
variables to growth in the transition to the steady state, this is not very
satisfactory. For any plausible value of the share of capital in output, the
per capita growth rate declines rapidly with capital accumulation because of
diminishing returns. However, as we already saw, long-run per capita growth
in the Solow model depends only on exogenous technological change.
Table 3 shows a simulation of a Solow-type CES model with Constant
returns to scale, with alternative parameters for the share of capital and the
elasticity of substitution (e.s.).3 Beginning from arbitrary initial stocks
2.A survey of the empirical literature and some further empirical testing is
provided in Easterly and Wetzel (1989). Another general empirical
discussion is contained in Chenery et al. (1986).
3.Strictly speaking, the capital share' parameter referred to is the
coefficient on capital in the CES function, which is only equivalent to the
share of capital in output in the Cobb-Douglas case where e.s.=l.—6—
TABLE 3:Per capita growth rate during transition to steady state from Solow model
Capital share=0.4 at e.s.=1
Elasticity of substitution:
0.5 1.0 2.5 5.0
4.8% 4.7% 4.8% 4.5%
4.0% 4.3% 4.4% 4.5%
3.4% 3.8% 4.2% 4.3%
2.8% 3.5% 3.9% 4.1%
2.4% 3.2% 3.7% 3.9%
2.1% 2.9% 3.5% 3.7%
1.8% 2.7% 3.3% 3.5%
1.6% 2.5% 3.2% 3.4%
1.4% 2.3% 3.0% 3.3%
1.2% 2.1% 2.9% 3.2%
0.4% 1.1% 1.9% 2.3%
0.2% 0.6% 1.4% 1.7%
0.1% 0.4% 1.0% 1.4%
0.0% 0.2% 0.8% 1.1%
0.0% 0.0% 0.2% 0.5%
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Note:Investment ratio=.20 for allsimulations
Capital share=0.6 at e.s.4
Elasticity of substitution:














7.5% 7.3% 7.2% 7.2%
6.7% 6.8% 6.9% 6.9%
5.9% 6.3% 6.6% 6.7%
5.2% 5.9% 6.3% 6.5%
4.6% 5.5% 6.1% 6.3%
4.1% 5.2% 5.9% 6.1%
3.6% 4.9% 5.7% 6.0%
3.2% 4.6% 5.5% 5.8%
2.9% 4.4% 5.3% 5.7%
2.6% 4.1% 5.2% 5.5%
0.9% 2.5% 4.1% 4.6%
0.4% 1.6% 3.4% 4.1%
0.2% 1.1% 3.0% 3.8%
0.1% 0.8% 2.6% 3.6%
0.0% 0.2% 1.8% 3.1%
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%we7/l].-Ol-89 7
of capital and labor, per capita growth will initially take place as the
capital/labor ratio is increased towards its steady state value (which is zero
in this simulation since there is no technological change). We begin with the
year in which the growth rate is roughly the same for any elasticity of
substitution. Growth will be higher with a higher share of capital for fixed
initial stocks of capital and labor because the marginal product of capital
will be higher.
For all the various parameter combinations, there is a significant
fall-off in per capita growth over periods as short as a decade. The relative
decline in growth is more severe the lower is the share of capital and the
lower is the elasticity of substitution. In the worst case in the table
(capital share=.4 and e.s.O.5), per capita growth after a decade is only a
quarter of growth in the first year. But even in the best possible case of
extremely high e.s.(=5) and capital share (=.6), per capita growth still falls
from 7.2 percent to 5.5 percent over a decade. There is little evidence of
such rapid deceleration in growth in practice, which makes the Solow
transition unappealing as a model of supply-side growth.4
Recent works in the theoretical literature have addressed this
problem by dropping one of the key assumptions to the Solow model --constant
returns to scale. Such authors as Lucas (1987), Romer (1986. 1987, 1988,
l989a, l989b), Obstfeld (1989) and Barro (1989a, l989b) postulate increasing
returns that arise either from technological externalities from investment in
physical capital or spillovers from accumulation of human capital. With
increasing returns, per capita growth is possible in the long run based on
capital accumulation alone. The door is opened again for endogenous economic
variables, and thus policy, to affect the rate of long-run growth.
4.In principle, this deceleration could be countered by technical progress and
increased labor Quality, but there is no reason to assume these will offsetwe7/ll-Ol-89 8
II. Anincreasing returns model ofdistortions andgrowth
Themodel in this paper is intended as an illustration of the kind of
effects policy distortions can have on growth in an increasing returns
economy. It postulates a simple form of increasing returns that resultsin a
linear relationship between output and capital. It then considers the effect
of a distortion that causes the marginal products of different types of
capital to diverge. The relationship between the distortion and the rate of
growth is highly nonlinear, which suggests a certain caution about simplistic
assumptionsabout the effect of distortions on growth.
1.The model
Equation (1) shows the production function that will provide the
basis for our analysis.
1:1
Ill1 fi (1) Q= A -
7p)'l +P12J
L
Outputis a function of the stock of technological knowledge A, two
typesof capital K1 and K2, and labor L. The functional form chosen is a CES
functionof the two types of capital nested within a Cobb-Douglas function for
total capital and labor. The function exhibits constant returns to scale in
the three inputs. The mainfocusof the analysis will be on substitution
between the two types of capital and so the more general CES form is chosen
withelasticity of substitution lI(pl-l).
Thedistortion that will be considered is one that causes the
marginalproducts of the two forms of capital to diverge:wel/ 11-01-89
(2)
OK2
This specification covers any type of distortion that induces extrs
costs to the users of type 1 capital.5The most obvious is a tax by the
government on the use of type 1 capital, with type 2 capital exempt. The
distinction between the two capital types could reflect ownership, location,
or other characteristics: rural versus urban capital, human versus physical
capital, formal versus informal sector, corporate versus household capital,
imported versus domestically produced capital goods, or foreign-owned versus
domestically-owned capital. Besides taxes, other forms of distortion could
include credit subsidies or quantitative credit allocation to particular
capital types, or tariffs or QR's on imported capital goods. It could even
include macroeconomic instability that induces noise in relative prices of
capital goods.
Defining K as the sum of the two forms of capital, we can solve for
their relationship to K from (2) .Thedistortion t induces more of type 2











The specification of the technological knowledge parameter A as
endogenous is what will make the economy exhibit increasing returns.
Following Romer (1986), we simply specify technological knowledge as a
function of the stocks of capital and labor:
(5) A=8K
p
In the long run, the stock of knowledge will be positively related to
the stock of capital. This is because of learning that takes place in the
process of creating physical or human capital, including the unintended
spillovers to knowledge in other areas outside the one receiving the
investment. More generally, innovation and investment respond to
fundamentally the same incentives, so that in the long run an increase in
capital will be associated with an increase in the stock of knowledge.
Of course, in the short run changes in capital are not necessarily
matched by changes in knowledge --awar that wipes out half a nation's
physical capital leaves its stock of knowledge untouched. Also, the stock of
knowledge will be influenced by investment in other countries, so there will
be externalities across national borders. This last fact is not addressed by
our model, but it is probably not as serious as it first appears, since much
of the relevant knowledge is at the very specific level needed to implement
technical advances in local circumstances.we7/ll-O1-89 11
The relationship between labor and the stock of knowledge is less
clear. On one hand, there is the argument that the larger the population the
more likely it is to produce an Einstein who will make a huge contribution to
knowledge. On the other side, some have argued that abundant labor (relative
to land or capital) acts as a disincentive to innovation --'necessityis the
mother of invention.' The relative scarcity of labor in the 19th century
U.S., for example, has been cited by some economic historians as the key
factor explaining the huge amount of labor-substituting innovation that took
place.6 Soin equation (3) could be positive or negative.
Substituting from (3), (4) and (5) into (1), we get the following










To analyze the steady state, it is convenient to study cases where
output is linearly related to capital, as in traditional development models
and the models of Romer (1986) and Barro (1989a). For that we would assume
6.Habakkuk (1962).we7/ll—Ol-89 12
X =fi. Forthe role of labor in the steady state, we consider three special
cases that lead to similar analytical forms, although they have different
interpretations. The most obvious is one where population is stationary in
the steady state, so that we can normalize L=1 and it will drop Out of (6).
Secondly, we could assume is equal to 1-fl, implying that output is a linear
function of labor, or that per capita income is a function of the capital
stock.
Finally,could be equal to 4.implyingthat that technical
knowledge is negatively related to labor and that total output is not a
function of labor in the steady state. Capital is defined to include human
capital, so labor skills continue to have an effect on production. Such a
relation would only hold in the long run --arelative decrease in labor
creates an incentive to accumulation of technical knowledge that exactly
offsets the decline in physical labor. In the short run, increases in labor
still increase output.
Assuming that A= fi andthat labor is constant in steady state (Or
=-45),we get the following expression for gross output:
(8)
It follows that growth in output will be given by the following:
(9) gai -5
wherei is the ratio of gross investment to output and 5isthe rate of
depreciation on capital. Growth is a function of the rate of grosswe7/11-Ol—89 13
investment, and the productivity of capital a$. Capital productivity reflects
the effects of the distortion t, as shown in (7).
In the steady state in the open economy, investment will be equal to
the saving rate plus some sustainable amount of foreign borrowing. We define
sustainability as the requirement that the ratio of foreign debt to the
capital stock be constant in the long run. Then investment will be given by




wherer is the real interest rate paid on foreign debt and is the ratio of
debt to the capital stock. Substituting from (10) into (9), we can get a
reduced form for the growth rate as follows:
(11) g =j——[ss -nC2
-
5]
Growthwill be given by the total productivity of saving, as measured
by the saving rate times the productivity of capital, less interest on debt
and depreciation, times the multiplier l/(lC) that reflects the leveraging
of saving into capital accumulation.
We can then substitute (11) back into (10) to get the steady state
rate of investment:
-(r+6) sC/6I
(12) i =we7/ll-0l—89 14
2. Simulations of distortion and steady-state growth
We can simulate equation (11) to show the relationship between growth
and distortion for plausible parameter values.7Figure 1 shows the steady
state growth rate that corresponds to different values of t. It is clear that
the relationship is highly nonlinear. As t increases from zero, the effect on
growth is slight at first. Successive increases in t, however, cause larger
and larger decreases in growth, as shown in the second panel of figure 1.
However, at some point the effect on growth from successive distortion
increases again diminishes. As t gets very large, the growth rate
asymptotically approaches a minimum.
The nonlinear behavior of the model reflects two fundamental economic
phenomena. The first is the phenomenon of diminishing returns. Although
increases in total capital lead to proportional increases in output, increases
in one form of capital alone will lead to successively smaller increases in
output. As higher and higher distortions induce capital to shift from type 1
to type 2, more output and growth is sacrificed as diminishing returns set in
on the use of type 2 capital. However, as the distortion increases the use of
type 1 capital approaches zero. As it gets close to zero, the damage caused
by additional increases in distortion become slight. Intuitively, there is
not much difference between the effect of a 500% tax and a 600% tax --both
lead to the disappearance of the factor being taxed. Thus, growth reaches an
absolute minimum (about 52 in figure 1) no matter how high the distortion.
A real world example of this phenomenon might be the informal sector
as dramatized recently by de Soto (1987). A high level of State regulation of
7.For the base case, we specify a— .798,fi— .4, —.05.Pi.6(elasticity
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the formal sector simply causes capital to be transferrred to the informal
sector. Growth continues at a certain level outside the control of the state,
although it is lover than it would be if the formal sector were also
unregulated, since the two types of capital are not perfect substitutes.
3. Sensitivity to structural parameters
It is clear from the expression for I in (7) that the critical
parameter is the substitution parameter Pi To see the effect of this
parameter on behavior of the model, we consider alternative values of the
elasticity of substitution (with absolute value equal to l/(l-pi)). Figure 2
shows distortion-growth relationship for 2 extreme values of the elasticity of
substitution --0.5and 5.0 in absolute value. At low levels of distortion,
the growth rate is higher with the lower elasticity. With inelastic
substitution between types of capital, resource allocation is not changed as
much by a given distortion and the loss of output is not as great.
However, as the distortion increases, growth reaches a minimum with
the higher elasticity, but continues to decline with the inelastic production
function. It can be shown from (7) that $ goes to zero if the elasticity of
substitution is less than or equal to one, while it has a nonzero limit if the
elasticity is greater than one.8 Intuitively, if the substitution of type 2
for type 1 capital is not strong enough to offset the effect of the
distortion, then output goes to zero as t increases. To put it another way,
8.If the elasticity of substitution is less than one in absolute value, then
P1 is negative. Thus, the first term in (7) explodes as t goes to infinity.
Since the exponent (1-fl)/p1 is also negative, $ goes to zero. If P1 >0.
then $convergesto raised to the power of (l-fl)Ipl.—i_I —
O3037 080 0111OI71O































type 2 capital is not a good substitute for type 1 capital. As the use of type
1 capital is driven to zero by an arbitrarily large distortion, output will
also go to zero.
The results of the model suggest that we must carefully evaluate the
structure of the economy and the initial level of distortion in order to
predict the long run effect of reducing distortions. In an economy with a low
elasticity of substitution, reducing a small distortion may have little effect
on growth. As figure 2 showed, the growth-distortion relationship is very
flat for low distortion levels if the elasticity of substitution is small.
Conversely, in an economy with a high elasticity of substitution, a small
reduction in a high rate of distortion also may not have much effect. Such an
economy may have already passed the rate of distortion at which the growth
rate reaches a minimum. The true payoff to distortion reduction comes in the
steep part of the curves in figure 2. which comes at lover rates of distortion
in the high-substitution economy.
An example where the elasticity of substitution would be important in
practice can be given by treating K1 as imported capital goods and K2 as
domestically produced capital goods. The distortion t would be an import
tariff or quota that raises the user cost of l• If the structure of the
economy (resource endowments, size of the economy. etc.) is such as to foster
an efficient domestic capital goods industry, then K1 and K2 would be close
substitutes. In this case, even low levels of the tariff or quota premium t
would distort resource allocation and lower growth significantly. However, as
t is increased, the use of imported capital goods would approach zero and
further changes in t would not make much difference to the rate of growth
On the other hand, an economy in which structural characteristics
restrict the scope of the domestic capital goods industry would have a lowwe7/ll—O1-89 19
elasticity of substitution between l and 1(2.In this economy, small changes
to low import tariffs or quota premia on capital goods would not make much
difference. As import restrictions are tightened further and further,
however, the damage to output and growth is practically unlimited. The use of
imported capital goods does not go to zero very fast as t increases because
they have no close substitute.
The implications of trade liberalization for capital goods would be
very different in these two types of economies. In the high-substitution
economy, small reductions in tariffs or quotas would be beneficial from low
initial levels, but would not make much difference if initial tariffs or quota
premia are high. In the low-substitution economy, trade liberalization from
low distortion levels would make little difference, but would be very
effective if initial trade distortions were high.
The finding that there is a maximum loss of growth associated with
distortion also has important policy implications. If the substitution
elasticity is high enough, the loss of growth from distortion may be small
enough that it can be offset by other policy measures. Table 4 shows the
maximum loss of growth associated with an infinite level of distortion for
different elasticities of substitution. At elasticities of substitution
higher than 2.5, the drop in the growth rate is under 5 percentage points.
The obvious variable to play the role of offsetting influence on
growth in our model is saving. Since Ireachesa nonzero limit as t goes to
infinity with the elasticity of substitution greater than one, there is a
finite amount of saving that can offset even an infinitely large distortion in
such economies. Table 5 shows the saving increase that would be required.
With e greater than 2.5, the increase in the saving rate is less than nine
points of GDP. While this represents a massive loss in welfare, it does show— 20—
TABLE4:
Maximum decline in growth rate from
infinitely large distortion--
alternative elasticities of substitution
Elasticity Maximum decline















that even the most highly distorted economy can grow rapidly if saving is high
enough. This may help to explain why an economy such as China known to be
characterized by high state intervention and distortion could still grow
respectably with a high saving rate.9
The other important structural parameter in the production function
is the coefficient 7. This measures the technological importance of K2 in
the production function. If the elasticity of substitution is equal to unity
(Cobb-Douglas), then is the value share of K2 in total capital. With an
elasticity of substitution different from unity, the share of K2 will not be
constant but will still be positively affected by 7.
Figure 3 shows the effect of changing 'yonthe growth-distortion
relationship. A larger 7 means that the type of capital favored by the
distortion t is more important in total production, while the type of capital
being penalized is less important. This will imply that a given distortion is
nuch less damaging to growth, as shown in figure 3.
A real world example of the effect of can be given by once again
treating K1 as formal sector capital and K2 as informal capital. If is
high, then informal sector capital has a large weight in the production
function, while the modern sector has a small weight. The effect of
distortions imposed on the modern sector would be modest in such a case.
How differs across countries is not very clear. Even in countries
that appear to have a large share of production accounted for by informal
capital, it is difficult to distinguish whether this is due to the relative
9.This contrasts to the explanation of Lucas (1988) who argued that the fact
that centrally planned economies have respectable growth rates confirms that
distortions only have level effects rather than growth effects.— 22—
TABLE5: Required increase in saving to offset
decrease in growth due to infinite distortion
Elasticity of Required increase
substitution In saving
(ratio to GDP)
























































































































































































































size of K1 and K2 or to the technological parameter 7. The former is an
endogenous response to distortion, while the latter is exogenous. However, a
larger share of informal capital in one country with the same distortion level
as another would imply a larger 7 in the first country, which may be due to
cultural and historical factors or the overall level of development.
III. Distortionary taxes, size of government, and growth
The variable t has been treated so far as a generic distortion that
simply causes marginal products of capital to diverge. We can extend the
model to the analysis of fiscal behavior by treating t strictly as a tax on
one form of capital. We will also treat this tax as the only form of tax
revenue for the government. While an exaggeration, this is not unlike the
situation in many developing countries where taxes are highly distortionary
and large segments of the economy escape taxation altogether. A conmton
situation is that the capital in the rural/subsistence/traditional sector
largely escapes taxation, while the modern sector or export sector is heavily
taxed.
Although the state lowers growth by imposing distortionary taxes, it
can also contribute to growth by providing essential public goods such as
roads, sanitation services, etc. Lack of such public goods in the absence of
the state is itself a distortion. Since these are financed by taxes, we have a
tradeoff between two types of distortions --onecaused by insufficient public
goods and one caused by distortionary taxes.
1. The Model
We modify the production function from (1) to include a public
capital stock:we7/l1-Ol—89 25







Total capital K will be the aggregate of the two types of private capital (K1
and K2) and public capital KG. The form of the production function is a CES
function of the two types of private capital nested within a CES function of
public and private capital, which is in turn nested within a Cobb-Douglas
function for capital and labor. Thus, P1 is the substitution parameter
between the 2 types of private capital, while P2 is the substitution parameter
between public and private capital. We make the same assumptions about A as
before except relating to total capital K. Equations (3) and (4) continue to
hold for the determination of the two types of private capital as a share of
total private capital, with 71 1-7p and 72 = Denoting k as the share
of private capital in the total, we can substitute from (3), (4), and (5) into
(13) to derive a new expression for •:
O2

















Output continues to be given as a linear function of K with a$ as the
output-capital ratio. Thus growth can be given as a function of public and
private investment analogously to (6) above. We will define public and
private investment equations based on their saving behavior and sustainable
borrowing, analogous to (10) above.
Tax revenue as a ratio to output will be given as the linear tax rate









The accumulation of government capital will then be given as the
saving ratio sG times tax revenue, less depreciation and interest on debt,
plus new sustainable borrowing. The latter is defined as keeping the ratio of
government debt to output constant, which implies new borrowing will be the
growth rate times the ratio of debt to output, which in turn is equal to the
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An analogous expression will hold for the accumulation of private
capital in steady state, except that private income is defined as total output
less the tax revenue collected by the government:
(17) =s[.
- - — - (r-g)
Substituting from (15) into (16) and (17),
the expression forg,we get the following
(18) g









The right-hand side of (18) still contains an endogenous variable, the share
of private capital in total capital, k. To derive the steady state level of
we need another equilibrium condition. (18) is derived from the condition
that the percentage change in total capital be equal to the growth rate.
However, in a steady state for k. we also have the condition that the
percentage change in private capital be equal to the percentage change in
public capital. Equivalently, the percentage change in public capital must
also be equal to the growth rate. From (16), this gives us the following
expression for kp:we7/11—Ol-89 28
g + 5+(r-g) G
(19) k
-
(18)and (19) together determine the steady state values of k and g.
2. Simulation of growth and tax revenue
We again use the method of simulating the model for plausible values
of the parameters to illustrate the properties of the model)° The first
relationship of interest is that between the tax rate and tax revenue, shown
-
infigure 4. We get a standard Laffer curve relationship. As the tax rate
increases from zero, tax revenue initially rises rapidly, then flattens Out as
the decline in the tax base offsets the increase in the rate. If the
elasticity of substitution between K1 and K2 is greater than one, then the
effect of the decline in the tax base will eventually outweigh that of the
rate increase, so that revenue declines with rate increases.
The relationship between the growth rate and the tax rate is more
complex than in the model without government. As shown in figure 5, the
growth rate initially increases with a rise in the tax rate. This is because
tax revenues finance the accumulation of public capital, whose optimal level
is greater than zero. However, as more public capital is accumulated
diminishing returns set in, while at the same time the effect of the
lO.The parameters for the base case are a• 1.05,fi• 0.4,5• .05.'G =0.25,







































































































































































































































































































































distortion to private capital allocation worsens with successive tax rate
increasea. Thus, at some point further tax rate increases will lower the rate
of growth. From that point, the behavior of the growth-distortion relation ia
similar to the first model. Further increases in the tax rate are
increasingly costly up to the point in which Kjbecomesclose enough to zero
that further rate increases do not make much difference. After that growth
reaches a minimum if the elasticity of substitution is sufficiently large,
just as in the model without government. However, the cost of an arbitrarily
large tax rate will be larger in the model with government, because in
addition to the arbitrarily large distortion the stock of public oapital will
approach zero as tax revenue goes to zero.
Putting figures 4 and B together, we can see the relationship between
tax revenue and growth that will be traced out by varying the tax rate from
zero to infinity. At point A in figure 6, the tax rate is at zero. Both
growth and tax revenue increase strongly as the tax rate rises, sinoe the
additional tax revenue is used to finance the acquisition of productive public
capital. Growth reaches a maximum at B, at which point the positive
contribution of public capital to growth just offsets the negative effect of
the tax distortion. From B to C, further increases in tax rates lead to a
tradeoff between tax revenue and growth --theycontinue to increase revenue
(and public capital) but at the expense of a distortion severe enough to
reduce growth. At C, tax revenue as a ratio to output reaches its maximum as
in the Laffer curve of figure 4. From that point on, tax rate increases are
counterproductive in terms of both revenue and growth --revenuedeclines
because we are on the "wrong' side of the Laffer curve, and gruwth declines



































































minimum growth rate where tax revenue and the use of both K1 and KG are
arbitrarily close to zero.
Figure 6 suggests caution on attempting to estimate the empirical
correlation between growth and the size of government (as measured either by
revenue or spending) .Ifwe think of countries with similar structure but
different tax rates being distributed randomly along the curve estimates of
the relationship could be positive or negative. The absolute value of the
coefficient on size of government in a growth regression could range from zero
(at point B) to infinity (at point C). Even the interpretation of the
coefficient is ambiguous. A positive relationship is implied by both of the
segments AB and CD, but for much different reasons --theformer because tax
rate hikes increase both growth and revenue and the latter because rate hikes
decrease both. Causation is also problematic since both tax revenue and
growth are endogenous.
To try to pin down where governments might wind up on figure 6 is a
task for political economy theory. The benevolent growth-maximizing
governments would tend to cluster around B.(As Barro (1989a) points out in a
similar context, if we estimated a regression between growth and size of
government from such a sample, we would erroneously conclude there was no
relationship between the two.)
would move more towards point C
The Buchanan-type patronage-maximizing state
(but not all the way if it also values future
patronage which will increase with higher growth). In general, a rational
state valuing some mixture of patronage and growth would be in the segment BC,
which might explain the negative relationship traditionally found in empirical
work. However, there are examples from the political economy literature of
irrational outcomes from game-theoretic interactions between factions or
coalitions, which could result in governments being along AS or CD.11
ll.See the survey in Haggard (1989). See also Findlay (1989) and Srinivasan
(1989) for provocative analyses of how the state behaves.we7/ll—Ol-89 34
This model can also yield insight on the relationship between public
and private investment. Figure 7 shows the combinations of public and private
inveatment rates associated with different levels of the tax rate. This
diagram should give us pause about the possibility of empirically estimating
simple cross-section relationships between public and private investment, at
least across steady states with different tax rates.
Initial increases in the tax rate (from zero at point A) increase
growth sharply, which raises the financeable level of private investment
(because the private sector can borrow more) .However,the increase in tax
revenue decreases private saving, lowering the financeable level of private
investment. The two effects roughly offset each other for the initial
increases in the tax rate (the positive effect even dominates at first).
After that, however,'crowding out' of private investment by public
investment takes place due to the redistribution of income from the private to
the public sector with higher taxes. Growth could still be increasing over
part of this range, however, if public investment is below the optimal level.
At point B, tax revenue is maximized. Further tax rate increases lower
revenue, so income is redistributed back towards the private sector, raising
private and lowering public investment. At some point the effect of the
distortion on growth becomes so severe, however, as to lower the financeable
level of private investment again.
3. Tax reform and growth
So far we have taken as given that taxes are distortionary, since
only one type of capital can be taxed. What if in fact a tax reform can be
initiated that taxes both forms of capital equally? This makes it possible to














































































































































private capital between the two types. Tax revenue will be given as a
function of private capital instead of type 1 capital alone. More tax revenue
will be generated at each tax rate, while the tax rate itself does not
directly affect growth.
A tax on all private capital makes it possible to generate a higher
growth rate, since the tax will not distort private capital allocation and
lead to efficiency losses. However, the difference is not dramatic--in the
base case simulation described above, the maximum growth rate with a tax on
one form of capital is 8.06%, while with a tax on all private capital maximum
growth is 8.53%. Thus, reform of the tax system to tax all capital would lead
to an improvement of roughly half a percentage point in the long run growth
rate.
The effect of tax reform on growth is not large because we are
comparing optimal policies in the two cases. With optimal policies, the tax
rates will not be large--the optimal exponential rate is 36% with differential
taxation and 25% in the case of uniform taxation of private capital. As was
seen in the first section, the distortionary effect of low tax rates is
limited, since diminishing returns have not come into play very strongly at
low rates of distortion.
Tax reform makes much more of a difference if policies were not
optimal to begin with. Figure 8 compares the relationship between tax revenue
(as a ratio to output) and growth under uniform and differential taxation. It
is evident that tax reform makes little difference if the initial level of
revenue (and thus tax rate) is low. Roughly similar rates of growth are
associated with low levels of tax revenue under the differential tax as under
the uniform tax. Thus, a "revenue-neutral' tax reform at low levels of
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The picture changes, however, as further increases in tax rates and
revenue are initiated under the two regimes. At the point of maximum revenue
under the differential tax regime, growth is 1.3 percentage points lower than
it is at comparable revenue levels under the uniform tax regime. After that,
further increases in tax rates on one form of capital would cause both revenue
and growth to fall. In such a situation, a "revenue-neutral" tax reform that
involved both a reduction of the rate and an extension of the base would have
two major benefits. It would move the economy back to the 'right" side of the
Laffer curve (a movement along the curve in figure 8(b)), and it would make
possible a higher growth rate through less distortion of allocation of private
capital (a movement from the curve in 8(b) to the curve in 8(a)). As can be
seen from the graph, the first effect is likely to be more larger than the
second. The value of a uniform tax rate regime is that it not only makes
possible the attainment of a higher maximum growth rate, it also limits the
damage from moving to the 'wrong' side of the Laffer curve.
4. The effect of government saving
Beside the tax rate, the critical fiscal policy variable in this
model is the saving rate s. This does not necessarily correspond to the
traditional measure of government saving, i.e. current revenue less current
expenditure. Rather it signifies the share of government tax revenue that is
devoted to productive expenditure. This could include such staples of current
expenditure as primary schoolteachers' salaries. Conversely, it would not
include nonproductive items that might be included as part of traditional
measures of government investment.
Figure 9 shows the implications of different government saving rates
for the growth-tax rate relationship. In general, the higher the government






































































































































































higher rate of government saving for a given tax rate and private saving rate
raises total saving and total capital accumulation. It is also apparent from
the graph that the growth rate will reach a maximum at a higher tax rate the
higher is the government saving rate. Higher government saving means that tax
rate increases pay off more in higher public investment, which will offset
more the distortionary effects of the tax rate increases.
More unusual is the result shown in the graph for the extreme case in
which the government has zero saving. Here tax rate increases always
initially lead to a decrease in growth, since there is no offsetting benefit
from productive government expenditure. Eventually, however, the growth rate
hits bottom and then rises again with further tax increases. How can tax
increases be good for growth if there is no productive government spending?
The answer is that we are on the "wrong" side of the Laffer curve where tax
rate increases decrease revenue, which in this case is a blessing in disguise.
Since tax revenue is redistributing income from the high saving private sector
to the zero saving government, a decrease in tax revenue has a positive effect
on saving. This more than offsets the distortionary effect of tax rate
increases in this case.
The implications of this peculiar case for the tax revenue-growth
relationship are displayed in figure 10. Tax revenue is negatively related to
growth, but with two possible slopes depending on which side of the Laffer
curve we are on. Also it is apparent that maximum tax revenue is higher as a
share of output than in the case of the high-saving government in figure 5.
This is because tax revenue is a function of the share of type 1 private
capital to output. Both the ratio of total capital to output and the ratio of



























































































































































































The model in this paper has concentrated only on steady states and
thus ignores much of the complexity of policy-making in which transitions play
a large role. Although a model of transitions between steady-states would
sacrifice the long-run simplicity of this model and give many ambiguous
results, it is a fruitful area for further investigation. However, this paper
has shown how a steady-state model can yield many insights.
The structural model of distortions and growth in this paper suggests
that the relationship is more complicated than is acknowledged in most of the
empirical work on growth. In particular, simplistic assumptions about linear
inverse relationships between distortion and growth or between size of
government and growth appear untenable. However, some of the complexities of
the growth-distortion relationship can be captured by a simple increasing
returns model that could in principle be estimated for a particular country.
Such a model could enrich the dialogue between advocates of
liberalization and policymakers by recognizing that decreasing distortions
does not have an equal effect on growth in all circumstances. The effect
depends on how flexible the economy is (the elasticity of substitution) ,how
large is the share of the factor being penalized in production, and how high
distortions are initially. The policymaker should attempt to identify and to
move along the steeply-sloped portion of the growth-distortion relationship
where the payoff from reducing distortions is high. Small changes to either
very low levels or very high levels of initial distortions have a minimal
effect on growth. It would be unfortunate if policymakers expended political
capital on such changes when the long run effects on growth are likely to be
disappointing.we7fll-Ol-89 43
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